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STATE PROVISION FOR OLD AGE IN MALTA 
By A.W. ROTE 
INTRODUCTION 1 
AN important question for every individual is how he or she is to live suit-
ably in their old age. The purpose of this study, apart from the collection 
and presentation of data on social security, is to examine the present sys-
tem of old age benefits in Malta in the light of the social insuranceobjec-
tive of helping to replace earnings when they cease at the end of a work-
ing life. 2 Social security for our purposes can be divided in to two sec-
tions, each acting independently, being National Insurance and Public 
Assistance. Before considering each of these provisions in detail it is im-
portant to have some understanding of the magnitude of the problem with 
which we are to deal. 
It is evident from Table I, which presents the age distribution of the 
population of the Maltese Islands for selected years, that the dependent 
sector of the community (the aged? is enlarging relative to the contribut-
ing sector, being those in the middle age group. 
In 1948 there were 22,881 aged persons (7.5% of the total population) ~ 
and according to official estimates it is expected that this figure will 
rise to 44,600 in 1988 (14.7% of the total population). 
The problem created by this 'growing army of pensioners' becomes more 
obvious if we construct a dependency ratio, that is, by considering the 
relationship between those in the middle age group and those in the aged 
we can obtain one kind of measure to assess the burden placed on the 
former sector. It can be seen that for every aged person in 1948 there 
were 7.7 persons supporting him. By 1988 however, it is expected that 
lThe author would like to acknowledge the help of members of the Department of 
Social Services. The views expressed in this study are the sole res ponsibility of 
the author. 
2 See J .M. Buchanan: Social Insurance in a Growing Economy: A Proposal lOT Ra-
dical Relorm. 
National Tax Journal, Vol. XXI, No. 4 1968 pp. 386-395. 
3 Aged refers to men over 63, women over 60 unless otherwise stated. 
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Table I 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF 
THE MALTESE ISLANDS FOR SELECTED YEARS 
TOTAL· UNDER % OF MEN 15-64 % OF MEN 65 +OVER 
YEAR POPULATION 15 TOTAL WOMEN 15-60 TOTAL WOMEN 60 +OVER t 
1948 305,991 106,602 34.8 176,508 57.7 22,881 
1959 317,218 120,742 36.9 176,614 54.0 29,862 
1963 328,116 112,873 34.4 184,470 56.2 30,773 
1964 323,591 108,224 33.5 183,659 56.8 31,208 
1965 319,100 104,900 32.9 182,600 57.2 31,600 
1966 317,482 100,896 31.8 184,616 58.1 31,780 
1967 318,573 95,081 29.8 189,148 59.4 34,344 
1968 319,254 93,194 29.2 191,104 59.9 34,956 
1969 322,749 91,733 28.4 194,811 60.4 36,205 
1973 311,600 79,500 25.5 189,200 60.7 42,900 
1988 302,600 75,200 24.9 182,800 60.4 44,600 
• As at June of, each year. 
% OF 
TOTAL 
7.5 
9.1 
9.4 
9.7 
9.9 
10.1 
10.8 
10.9 
11.2 
13.8 
14.7 
tFor years 1963-1969 the table underestimated the number of aged, as retirement 
age became 63 for men in 1963. The figures for 1973 and 1988 are based on a re-
tirement age of 60 for men. 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1959; 1964; Demographic Review 1965-1967; 
Central Office of Statistics. 
this ratio would have fallen to 4.1 persons to every aged person. The ra-
tio having already fallen to 5.4 in 1969.4 
One is however, entitled to ask why this particular section of the com-
munity should be selected for examination, other than say workers with 
low wages. It is relevant to point out that age itself involves certain dif-
ficulties, physical decline and earning power often go hand in hand and 
any loss the aged may incur cannot be recouped by increasing efforts un-
like the non aged who ha ve both the time and health to do so. Indeed 
'there is a certain, though probably undefinable, point, at which age be-
comes itself a disability and at which disability is materially contributed 
to by old age.'s 
This disability argument may carry more weight as physical decline 
4 For an analys is of the economic problems of an ageing population see W. Hagen-
buch: Social Economics Cambridge Univers ity Press 1958 pp.49-54. 
5 Royal Commission on the Taxation 0/ pro/its and Income: 
2nd Report. Cnd 9105 1954 p. 64 para. 204. 
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coincides with the depletion of lifetime savings. An American study found 
that 'prospects become bleak' as the aged become 0lder.6 It seems likely 
that some younger persons with the same low income levels as aged per-
sons will have better prospects, and since many of the low income non-
aged persons are very young workers living with parents, the fact that in-
come is low will not be so important as in the case of the aged persons, 
who are unable to rely on relatives for financial support. Their importance 
relative to other sectors is further enhanced when viewed against the 
background of rapidly rising prices whilst being dependent upon the good-
will of the state for commensurate rises in the level of their state pen-
SIon. 
NATIONAL INSURANCE 
The National Insurance old age pension was introduced in 1956, it being 
a flat rate benefit obtained on reaching a specific age based on a system 
of contribution. The difference between National Insurance and Public 
Assistance lies both in their financing and method of payment. The Na-
tional Insurance pension is financed by a tripartite contribution system; 
employees, employers and a contribution from the state forms the basis of 
the National Insurance Fund ftom which all benefits are met. The three 
sources of finance have changed considerably with the passage of time. 
They have not only increased, both relatively and absolutely, but they are 
no longer provided by those to whom they were originally assigned. Only 
the employee's contribution has remained as part of income saved for old 
age. The employer's contribution on the other hand is no longer paid for 
out of the profits of an enterprise but is a part of the labour costs, includ-
ed in pricing when the market allows. Thus the burden of the contribution 
is shifted wholly or partly to consumers (by a price rise) or to the workers 
(when wages are altered). The extent and rapidity of this shifting will de-
pend on the elasticity of consumer demand, on the elasticity of demand 
for labour and on the bargaining strength of employees in the wage deter-
mining process. 
Since those who receive benefits also bear a not inconsiderable share 
in the payment of direct and indirect taxes, part of the state contribution 
today is provided by the citizens who will themselves receive benefits 
in the future. These citizens, therefore, do not, as was originally intend-
ed, receive any additional income but only a return on that which was ori-
6 J .A. Pechman, H.J. Aaron, M.K. Taussig: Social Security: Perspectives jor Re-
lonn. p.7 Brookings Institution 1968 Washington DC. 
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ginally theirs. It can be argued that a special contribution made by the 
employer and employee is actually a tax, but as it is directly related to 
benefits it is readily accepted and has psychological advantages. It re-
moves the stigma of charity and gives beneficiaries a feeling that they 
can draw standard benefits as of right. 
It could be argued that one should not describe contributing systems 
of social security as a form of social insurance on the basis that the con-
tributions are compulsory and are therefore a tax levied by the state and 
since these contributions are not enough to cover risks, the state assumes 
responsibility for the difference which may be an uncertain amount and 
is borne by the tax payer. 7 The fact that the contribution does have a 
characteristic of a tax does not however, affect the category of the scheme, 
for the levy gives with it a title to a benefit. This is as much an insurance 
as the compulsory nature of insurance for the motorist imposed by the 
state. 
The principle of the National Insurance Scheme can best be described 
as a 'contract of the generations'. This contract of the generations sta-
tes that the active generation must care for the old and can therefore ex-
pect that the coming generation will in turn take over the obligation to 
care for its old. This sounds very fine, but it is uncertain whether the 
young, who in all countries today are so restless, will in fact accept the 
burdens assigned to them in the future. 
When the scheme was first introduced contributions - from all sources-
were larger than expenditures - benefits8 - and so a balance was accu-
mulated. As more people qualified for the pension so payments exceeded 
contributions and the deficit was covered by lowering the balance of the 
Fund. In order to finance future pensions, contributions must be raised 
and the burden will be made even heavier if an increasing number of in-
sured persons retire after a regular working life with higher pensions or 
if the pensionable age is lowered. 
As with all transfer payments an analysis of benefits inevitably invol-
ves an analysis of costs. Whilst below we emphasize the level of bene-
fits it must be borne in mind that benefits can only be increased by fore-
saking alternative social welfare schemes. 
7 See for example A.T. Peacock: The Economics of National Insurance London 
1952 p.89. 
8 The National Insurance Fund exists for the payment of benefits only. Adminis-
tration expenses are met from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
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Since its introduction9 the National Insurance old age pension has been 
increased three times for single persons and four times for married coup-
les. In money terms the values of the pensions have increased by 14.7%. 
This, combined with the growing number of pensioners eligible for the 
state pension, has caused the total money value of pensions paid yearly 
to increase by 1426.5% since 1959. The table below illustrates the growth 
in the number of pensioners receiving contributory old age pensions since 
1959, classified by sex. Although these numbers are rapidly increasing 
it still only covers 19.11% of the aged (as compared with 3% in 1959). 
Table 11 
YEAR 
1959 
1%0 
1961 
1962 
1%3 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
NUMBER AND VALUE OF PENSIONS IN PAYMENT 
UNDER THE NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT 1956 
NUMBER OF PENSIONERS AS % OF MONEY VALUE AS % OFGNP 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL AGED OF PENSIONS (MARKET PRICE) 
£ 
701 189 890 2.98 57,862 0.1-2 
1043 267 1310 4.36 114,447 0.22 
1309 328 1637 5.43 147,183 0.28 
1722 404 2126 6.98 185,532 0.35 
3225 467 3692 12.00 413,668 0.79 
3713 549 4262 13.65 486,101 0.91 
4190 627 4817 15.24 557,171 0.97 
4730 697 5427 16.97 680,210 1.08 
5221 765 5986 17.43 748,164 1.09 
5656 829 6485 18.55 832,795 1.09 
6041 878 6919 19.11 883,301 1.02 
Source: Report of the Department of Emigration, Labour and Social Welfare 1959: 
1964. 
Report of the Department of Social Services 1965:1969. 
The figures for male beneficiaries combine both single males and mar-
ried males claiming an increase for their wives. The relationship berween 
these two has remained relatively constant throughout the period with ap-
proximately 33% of the male pensioners being single. It is evident that 
the majoriry of pension claimants should be male (87.3% in 1969) and 
that the male contingent has increased by a larger percentage than female. 
Since 1959 the number entitled to a pension has increased by 677 .4%. The 
9 As from 1959, being the first date pensions were payable, till 1970 including 
the 1970 changes_ 
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most noticeable increase being in 1963 when the pensionable age for men 
was lowered to 63 years old from 65. Coincident with this age reduction 
was the largest percentage increase in the pension (20%) which explains 
the large increase in the total value of the pension payable in that year. It 
can also be noted that the total value of pensions has increased relative 
to Gross National Product. Malta is now devoting 1.01% of its Gross Na-
tional Product to providing old age pensions under the National Insurance 
Scheme. 
The present rate of old age pension IS 42/6d per week. This rate is in-
creased to 63/9d in the case of a married man. Provided the contribution 
conditions are satisfied the old age pension is paid as soon as the insur-
ed reaches pension age, which is 62 for men and 60 for women.10 Entitle-
ment to the old age pension is earned even when an insured person re-
mains gainfully occupied. When the contribution conditions are not fully 
satisfied because of a deficiency in the contribution record, the old age 
pension is paid at a reduced rate. 
A flat rate pension has three main advantages. They are easily admi-
nistered, people with higher wages are free to make additional provision 
by voluntary savings (including private insurance) and supplementary occu-
pational pension schemes can be readily adjusted to them. Also, since 
they are paid without a means test, they, like pensions which vary directly 
with wages, do not discourage thrift. On the other hand, it does involve 
payment to some who are not in need, but this disadvantage is compensat-
ed by the administrative convenience, by the promotion of thrift and by 
the fact that the majority of recipients will have low incomes on retire-
ment. 
The effect of social insurance pensions on savings however, is not all 
that certain. It has been suggested that the introduction of social insu-
rance may stimulate greater interest in making provision for old age and 
other contingencies, and may lead to increased savings in order to supp-
lement the social insurance benefit, in order to provide for a realistic le-
vel of retirement income whereas before it was hopeless to do SO.l1 How-
ever, it has been suggested that the obverse will obtain; that the social 
10 The pension age for men was reduced from 63 years to 62 years as from 3rd Au-
gust 1970. 
11 See Philip Cagan The Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Savings - Evi-
dence from a Sample Survey National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional 
Paper 95. Columbia University Press 1965. And George Katona: The Mass Con-
sumption Society: McGraw-Hill 1964 Chapter 19. 
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insurance benefit reduces the need for private savings to a greater or les-
ser extent. 12 
It is relevant at this stage, whilst de aling wi th aggregate figures, to 
dwell upon the financing of the National Insurance Fund from which so-
cial security payments (including old age pensions) are payable. The ma-
jor source of revenue for the Fund is made up of the employer/employee 
contribution and the state grant. Employed persons from the age of 14 years 
and self employed and non-employed persons over the age of 19 years and 
under pension age, are liable to be insured. Employed persons contribu-
tions are shared equally by the employee and employer, including the 
Government in respect of its own employees. The contribution paid by 
employed persons, self employed persons and non-employed persons are re-
ferred to as Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 respectively. 
The state grant is equivalent to one half of every contribution paid in 
re spect of all categories of insured persons. In the early years of the pen-
sion scheme few, if any, pensions were in payment, and indeed no one 
qualified for such a pension until 1959. As a result, contributions were in 
excess of payments, funds accumulated, were invested and held as secu-
ri ty by the Fund. 13 The interest derived from the investments of the Fund 
plays a large part in meeting the cost of future benefits. 14 
The financing of social security under the National Insurance Act 1956. 
is shown in the following Table. When the scheme was first introduced 
the bulk of financing fell upon the beneficiaries themselves, supported by 
a fixed lump sum state grant of £40,000 per annum. As a result of a sur-
plus, other income, the main constituent of which is interest on investment, 
grew to a maximum of 14%. In 1962 the contribution made by the state in-
creased by some 160% to the level of £104,000 to satisfy some 17% of the 
total revenue of the Fund. 
In the following years, the part played by contributions declined some-
what with the state grant being increased to average 28% of total revenue. 
A deficit occured in 1965 and despite a larger increase in the state grant 
this deficit persisted in 1966 (though at a lower level). In the following 
12 See R.A. Musgrave The Role 0/ Social Insurance in an Overall Programme for 
Social Welfare in W.G. Bowen et al (eds.) The American System of Social Insu-
rance: Its Philosophy, Impact and Future Deve lopment. McGraw-Hill 1968. 
13 The position of the Fund at the end of 1969 is given in the Report 0/ the De-
partment 0/ Social Services lOT the year 1969 Table 9. 
14 The interest on investments amounted to some 9% of total revenue in 1968 and 
7.3% in 1969. 
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Table III 
ANALYSIS OF REVENUE OF THE NATIONAL INSURANCE FUND 1956:1969 
PENSION 
TOTAL % OF STATE % OF OTHER % OF PAYMENT 
YEAR ONTRIBUTlON AS % OF 
REVENUE TOTAL GRANT TOTAL INCOME TOTAL TOTAL 
REVENUE 
£ £ 
1956 249,830 206,881 82.8 40,000 16.0 2,949 1.2 -
1957 406,238 351,083 86.4 40,000 9.9 15,155 3.7 -
1958 490,945 422,412 86.0 40,000 8.2 28,533 5.8 -
1959 513,704 426,953 83.0 40,000 7.8 46,751 9.1 11.3 
1960 535,313 434,368 81.1 40,000 7.5 60,945 11.4 21.4 
1961 539,433 426,577 79.1 40,000 7.4 72,856 13.5 27.3 
1962 624,938 431,182 68.9 104,199 16.8 89,556 14.3 29.7 
1963 782,739 459,694 58.7 226,268 28.9 96,777 12.4 52.8 
1964 798,541 468,699 58.7 233,806 29.3 96,036 12.0 60.9 
1965 889,663 601,474 67.6 186,324 21.0 101,865 11.4 62.6. 
1966 1,119,879 658,818 58.8 357,546 31.9 103,515 10.3 60.7 
1967 1,162,062 681,504 61.8 318,347 28.9 102,211 10.3 71.7 
1968 1,144,078 706,841 61.8 329,763 28.8 107,474 10.4 77.2 
1969 1,198,154 734,524 61.3 372,389 31.1 91,341 7.6 73.7 
Source: Department of Emigration, Labour and Social Welfare 1956-1964. 
Department of Social Services 1965-1969. 
years however, the deficit enlarged. 15 
As a percentage of total revenue old age pensions have been increasing 
since the scheme was instigated, being some 77% of total revenue in 1968. 
As old age pensions form some 58% of total payments made out of the Fund 
it is not surprising that the Fund is now in substantial deficit. 16 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
Public Assistance is an inevitable and permanent feature of any social 
security system. It is designed either to supplement the resources of in-
dividuals so that they can manage to subsist or, if they have no resour-
ces, to be sufficient for their subsistence. Assistance for the needy is the 
oldest form of social security. It is a natural expression of human sym-
pathy, charity and compassion, an element in all religions, and based on 
15 See Report 0/ the Department 0/ Social Services for the year 1969 page 24. 
16 Ibid. p.24. 
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recognItiOn of mutual interdependence. 17 The Old Age Pension Act of 1948 
provides for the payment of a pension to needy persons on attaining the 
age of 60 years, and to blind persons from the age of 14. Old age pensions 
are paid to individual persons. Thus, a married couple who have attained 
the age of 60 years may each be entitled ro a non-contributory old age pen-
sion if they satisfy the statutory conditions regarding nationality, resi-
dence and means. 
In addition to a pension, such persons may receive assistance under 
the National Assistance Act 1956. This may include a house-rent allo-
wance, with a maximum of 5/- per week.18 The rate of pension varies in 
accordance with the yearly income of the beneficiary. One may make a 
further distinction between Public Assistance and National Insurance by 
noting their related roles in society. Public Assistance serves the objec-
ti ve of relieving poverty (the needy) whereas the other is an insurance 
against cessation of earnings. Furthermore, it is to be noted that Assis-
tance is financed entirely out of public funds. 
In the following Table, we include only those statistics relevant to the 
period in which the National Insurance scheme has been operative, com-
ments on previous years are based on statistics contained in Table A in 
the appendix. 
At the year ending 1969, there were 11,572 persons claiming an old age 
pension under the Old Age Pensions Act 1948, as compared with 15,546 
at the end of 1958. Thus after making allowance for those receiving a pen-
sion due to blindness we have a percentage decline of 25.6%. The declin-
ing number receiving old age pensions under this Act can be explained by 
the wider coverage of the insurance scheme, both extensively (Class I, II 
and HI) and intensively (within these groups). It is noticeable that in the 
years prior to the operation of the National Insurance scheme the number 
of claimants rose from 10,073 in 1948 to 15,546 in 1958. 
It can also be· seen from the Table that although the number of claimants 
has been reduced by 25.6% the value of pensions in payment has increas-
ed by 24%. We should therefore examine the Table in a little more detail. 
In the period 1958/1962, the value of the pension payments fell despite a 
slight increase in the numbers claiming the pension in 1962 over 1961. 
This only slightly counteracted the downward trend created by the intro-
17 See Milton Friedman: Capitalism and Freedom University of Chicago 1962 p. 
188. 
le 1969 old age pensioners made such a claim in 1969 as compared with 1705 in 
1968. 
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Table IV 
NON-CONTRIBUTORY OLD AGE PENSIONS 
YEAR MALE 
1958 5,341 
1959 4,944 
1960 5,098 
1961 4,599 
1962 4,602 
1963 4,409 
1964 4,302 
1965 4,321 
1966 4,115 
1967 3,834 
1968 3,478 
1969" 3,256 
t Adjusted to remove under 60's. 
eUnadjusted. 
FEMALE TOTALt VALUEe 
10,205 15,546 760,639 
10,300 15,244 757,348 
9,534 14,632 729,955 
9,583 14,182 711 ,174 
9,660 14,262 703,976 
9,591 14,000 883,423 
9,454 13,756 864,620 
9,597 13,918 903,732 
9,348 13,463 934,882 
8,993 12,827 897,697 
8,776 12,254 926,082 
8,316 11,572 943,128 
• Department of Social Services: National Assistance Division. 
Source: Report of Department of Social Services 1965:1968. 
Report of Department of Emigration, Labour and Social Welfare 1958-1964. 
duction of the Insurance scheme. In 1963 however, the total value increas-
ed despite the fall in the number of claimants. The large increase in value 
(25.5%) was due in part to the large and much delayed increase in the old 
age pension rate (25%). 
A slight increase in numbers in 1965 accompanied by a further increase 
in the flat rate pension caused a 4.5% increase in the value of pensions 
in payment. The full effect of this pension rate change was felt more fully 
in 1966 when the new pension operated for the full year - the value ofto-
tal payments increased by 3.4% in 1965/1966.19 In 1968 the pension rate 
was increased by 9.1%, causing a further increase in the total value of 
pensions in payment of 3.1%. Again in 1969 the rate was increased this 
time by 8.3% causing a 1.8% increase in the value of payments. 20 
It would seem that changes in the financial circumstances of benefi-
ciaries arising mainly as a result of entitlement of male pensioners21 to 
a pension under the National Insurance Act 1956 could be considered as 
19 1964/1966 saw an 8.1% increase in total payments. 
20 In 1970 there was a 15.4% increase in the pension rate. 
21 In the period 1958/1969 the male contingent fe II by 39% and the female by 
18%. 
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one of the main factors which brought about the drop in the numbers in 
receipt of non-contributory old age pensions. 
In Table V we express as a percentage of total recipients the number 
of recipients in each age group.22 
Table V 
AGE 
1958 
Under 60 1 
60 to 64 28 
65 to 69 24 
70 to 74 24 
75 to 80 13 
80 & over 9 
100 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RECIPIENTS OF 
OLD AGE PENSIONS (1948 ACT) 
YEAR 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1. 
28 23 21 27 19 19 20 24 
26 27 26 26 25 25 25 24 
23 22 24 23 25 24 23 24 
15 16 16 14 17 18 17 16 
7 11 11 9 13 13 13 12 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Percentage 
1967 1968 1969 
1 1 1 
19 18 17 
21 21 21 
24 24 23 
17 20 21 
18 16 17 
100 100 100 
It would seem that the age distribution of those receiving non-contribu-
tory old age pensions has shifted such that a more normal distribution 
would be obtained had we plotted age against percentage.classificarion. 
There is still nevertheless the tendency for a larger percentage of the to-
tal to be in the elder age group. For the age groups 60 to 74 the percen-
tage of total recipients had declined, for ages above this level however, 
the percentage has risen by quite large amounts. This shifting can be 
pardy explained by the lack of coverage for the elder group under the 
National Insurance scheme. On this evidence one might infer that the num-
ber of recipients would, in the passage of time, suffer a natural decline 
as these uncovered elderly are phased out and replaced by elderly who 
are covered. 
THE MEANS TEST: ITs OPERATION AND INCONSISTENCIES 
As explained earlier the flat rate pension is subject to reductions accor-
ding to the rates prescribed in the Schedule included in the Appendix 
Table D. The means test is based on total yearly income and not just 
earnings. The period of assessment is yearly so as to a void any problems 
22 For earlier years see the Appendix Tables Band C. 
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of fluctuating incomes during the period under consideration. F or ease of 
interpretation, the schedule has been expressed in diagramatic form which 
is presented in Figure 1. This will serve not only to explain the opera-
tion of the means test but also to show several deficiencies. On the hori-
zontal axis we have plotted yearly income and on the vertical axis we have 
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added the appropriate pension rate per week to obtain gross income. This 
diagram thus shows the relationship between own income and gross income 
(own income after the addition of the pension). When own income is zero 
the non-contributory old age pension will bring gross income to £97.10 . .Dd 
per annum, this as we will see later, with adjustment for the house rent 
allowance, can be regarded as poverty level for a single person aged 
over 60. Until the yearly income exceeds £26.5.0d. there is no reduction 
in the weekly pension rate. For incomes in excess of £26.5.0d. the pen-
sion is reduced by 3/- per week (£7.16.0d.), with further reduction as in-
come progresses. The result of these reductions in the pension rate is 
the dog toothed progression of the graph. When yearly income exceeds 
£65.12.6d. the pension is extinguished entirely and the pensioner must 
rely on his own resources to exist. It should be noted, of course, that 
this level of gross and own income falls below the poverty line of £97.10.0 
(excluding rent allowance) set by the State for a person having zero in-
come. Indeed if the pensioner were to be in this position he would be re-
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quired to increase his income by 49% in order to reach the poverty line, 
a not inconsiderable effort for someone so 01d.23 
This is further exaggerated when account is taken of the possible source 
of income. If income is earned then it must be stated that the decision to 
increase income may not always coincide with either the ability or the 
opportunity to do so. Furthermore, such income does incur the individual 
in costs, these real costs may involve the sacrifice of leisure and the re-
stricted place of residence. 24 If income is derived from investment then 
the decision to increase income can only take place via a sacrifice of 
present consumption which, for some one so near subsistence, would 
seem impracticable. This would also seem to be rewarding those who had 
been shortsighted as regards provision for old age whilst discriminating 
against those with foresight to have at least made some commitment to 
welfare in old age. It can be seen that when introduced in 1948 the scale 
was such that when the pension was extinguished own income was still 
some 60% above the poverty level (as given by gross income when own 
income is zero). 
Further examination will reveal further inconsistencies. Firstly, we may 
examine the peak to trough movements shown in the graph. It is inevitable 
in any means test that does not contain pro-rata reductions that over cer-
tain ranges there will be drastic falls in the level of gross income. An in-
dividual who increases his income (earned or investment) slightly, may 
find himself with a lower gross income due to the marked fall in the pen-
sion rate. This disincentive to increase income becomes more pronuonc-
ed when we examine the peak to peak movements. Once our individual has 
moved from say an income level of £26.5.0d. to just exceeding this level, 
he will find his gross income has declined. To counteract this tendency 
he may feel inclined to increase his work load (investment) in order to 
raise his own income. However, no matter how hard he works or how much 
he invests, within reason, he will not be able to reach the previous peak 
of gross income of £123.15.0d. The highest level he is now able to reach 
will be £121.7.0d. Furthermore, if own income is increased by too much 
the same step like action will cause this peak of gross income to decline 
23 For a single pensioner a claim for social assistance could rectify this anomaly. 
24 Granted that both income and leisure carry positive utilities, the sacrifice of 
either is a disutility. The net disutility of the income earning process need not 
imply that work is painful. One has simply to assume that the pleasure of work 
is out weighed by the opportunity pleasure of leisure. See R.A. Musgrave The 
Theory of Public Finance McGraw-Hill, 1959. p.233. 
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to £llB.17 .Od. As own income increases further, the peak of gross income 
falls progressively in three movements, until the pension is entirely ex-
tinguished. 
A better understanding may be obtained if the original schedule is exa-
mined,25 also presented in Figure I. When first introduced the schedule 
carried with it some disincentive in that m ere were still peak to trough 
movements, but the level of the trough rose as own income increased. An 
examination of the pension rate changes mroughout the years will reveal 
that the major part of the disincentive contained in the means test was in-
troduced in 1957. The increase involved in that year was designed such 
that the monetary addition declined with the lower pension levels, that 
is, at the top end of the scale 4/- per week was added, for the next four 
classes 3/- a week was added, 2/- per week for the next and an addition 
of one shilling per week for the last three classes, so causing the peak 
to peak downward movement and the generation of lower troughs. It should 
be noted however, that until 1965 the level of own income at the point 
where the pension was extinguished, remained above the poverty line. 
It would therefore seem that the penurious old age receive little help 
(if not discouragement) to help themselves when elderly. By adjusting 
their own income the elderly could however, alter their pension such that 
a larger gross income would be available. Certainly a full account of the 
implications of the means test should be made available to those receiv-
ing such a pension in order to secure for them the best possible standard 
of living and to prevent the harmful effects both financially and psycho-
logically of a reduction in income from additional work or investment. 
The opportunity for adjusting own income to take advantage (avoid the 
disadvantage) of such movements would however, seem to be prevented by 
th e Old Age Pension Act 1948, Section I (2) (4) which states: 
'If it appears that any person has directly or indirectly ... deprived him-
self of any income or property in order to qualify himself for the receipt 
of a pension, or for the receipt of a pension at a higher rate ... that 
income or yearly value of that property shall ... be taken to be part of 
the means of that person' . 
This does not however, prevent the pensioner from adjusting his own in-
come upwards in order to maximise his gross income or from declining to 
undertake additional work which would decrease his gross income. 
We may conclude therefore, that the means test apart from containing 
2S See Appendix Table D. 
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the psychological disincentives contained in any means test, does have 
certain disincentives contained in Its particular construction. Either these 
disincentives should be removed by appropriate rate changes or the elderly 
should be informed of their position as regards the relationship between 
gross and own income well before the time to claim the pension so as to 
enable those in certain ranges to adjust their yearly income to maximise 
their standard of living. 
INFLATION AND GROWTH 
Since 1956 the old age pension ha ve been increased many times speci-
fically with the objective of helping the elderly maintain or even increase 
their standard of living. Whilst it is not denied that these measures have 
provided some aid, the magnitude of it must be examined before any ap-
praisal can be made. It must be understood that the adequacy of pension 
increases will be judged relati ve to inflation and growth and not on an ab-
solute basis. Once more we will restrict our observations to the period 
under which both National Insurance and non-contributory old age pensions 
were claimable. The National Insurance old age pension, for both married 
and single persons, has increased some 41.7% in money terms since 1959, 
whilst the non-contributory old age pension has increased by 97.5%. 
The effect of inflation however, is such as to render any comparison in 
terms of money income invalid, to be able to do this it is essential to 
talk in real rather than money terms. This we do in Figure II where we ex-
press pensions in real rather than money terms. 26 For ease of presentation 
we deal only with the National Insurance old age pension for a married 
couple and the old age pension, plus house rent allowance, for a single 
person under the Old Age Pension Act 1948. 
From Figure II we are able to see how the real value of both pensions 
have fluctuated over time. The National Insurance pension for a married 
couple has increased by 11.1% from April 1960 to April 1970, during which 
26 As has been pointed out by Professor R.G.D.Allen, T. Lynes and others, the 
retail price index may not be appropriate due to different consumption patterns 
and different rates of inflation in commodity groups. For a discussion of special 
price indices for low income groups·see R.G.D. Allen Movements in Retail Prices 
Since 1953 Economica February 1958 pp. 14-25 and T.Lynes National Assistance 
and National Prosperity Occasional Paper on Social Administration No. 5 (Wel-
wyn, Codicote Press 1962). The necessity of such price indices has been rec-
ognised in the United Kingdom with the publication of indices for one and two 
pensioner households. One may therefore, call for such an index to be construc-
ted in Malta, from the results of a household expenditure survey which includes 
the elderly in order that the true level of real pens ions can be calculated. 
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time only three increases in money value took place (twice for single pen-
sioners). The long periods wi thout increase resulted in hardship for many 
due to price increases. Indeed, the pension level at April 1970 was below 
the level of the pension in January 1963. Even the August 1970 pension 
rate of 63/9d. per week will not raise the pension to the highest level in 
1966 unless the price index were to fall to 116.33 a most substanrial dec-
line. 
The old age pension under the 1948 Act has been increased four rimes 
between April 1960 and April 1970, which has provided an increase in the 
value of the pension of 24.8% in real terms. The increase in the pension 
to 37/6d. per week, plus house rent allowance, in August 1970, means 
that unless the price index rises to 136.22 the benefit will be above the 
April 1970 level. 
We are srill not able however to assess whether these increases were 
in some way adequate. Certainly in real terms the pensioner has gained 
an increase in his standard of living but if at the same rime other citizens 
of the community are reaping greater rewards from economic growth we 
will certainly not be able to s ay that pensions were correctly awarded. 
By calculating how pensions should rise in order to keep in line with Gross 
National Product per head we can tell to what extent the old age pension-
ers have shared in economic growth. It can be seen from Figure II that in 
the period January 1963 to January 1967, pensioners reaped the rewards 
of economic growth. But since 1967, it can no longer be said that pension-
ers have kept up with other groups who have been gaining substantially 
from rapid economic growth. 27 
POVERTI AND THE ELDERLY 
Although it is possible to measure the extent of poverty in a scienrific 
way as did Booth and Rowntree,28 this study adopts a different approach. 
We consider an elderly person to be living in 'poverty' if his income is 
27 Similar analys is in the United Kingdom revealed that since 1958 'it can no 
longer be said that those on National Assistance are not sharing in the increase 
in national prosperity'. 
Mrs. M.F.W.Hemming Social Security in Britain and Certain Other Countries 
National Institute Economic Review No.33 August 1965 p. 52. 
28 Rowntree regarded poverty as when tocal earnings were insufficient to obtain 
the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of physical efficiency. This level 
being based on nutritional need translated into money terms with an allowance 
for clothing, fuel and sundries. See B.S. Rowntree: Poverty - A Study 01 Town 
Lile Macmillan 1901. 
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below that at which he would qualify for Public Assistance. A similar ap-
proach has been used by Professors B. Abel-Smith and P. Townsend in 
their study 'The Poor and the Poorest' where they state: 29 
'Whatever may be said about the adequacy of the National Assistance 
Boards level of living as a just or publicly approved measure of "po-
verty", it has at least the advantage of being in a sense the "official" 
operational definition of the minimum level of living at any particular 
time'. 
The conceptual difficulties involved in Rowntree's absolute subsis-
tence level has been discussed in detail by Townsend. 30 The following 
approach must also be qualified and the results based on this definition 
should not be interpreted out of their context. Firstly, we make no judge-
ment as to the adequacy of such payments; secondly, the very nature of 
the definition means that any attempt by the Government to help low in-
come families by raising Public Assistance will have the effect of increa-
sing the number defined as living in poverty. This must obviously be borne 
in mind when making comparisons over time. 
We must also make some comment as to the unit we will be using to 
assess the degree of poverty. If we use as our minimum the non-contribu-
tory old age pension scale then we must talk of persons living in poverty, 
this will then, to some extent, overstate the number of persons with low 
actual incomes as it does not allow for sharing. Nevertheless, we will use 
this narrow definition, for we are more concerned with pensions, it being 
directly related to the unit used for the National Insurance pension. The 
Social Assistance minimum should however, be mentioned as this does 
allow for income sharing. Social Assistance may be payable when the 
head of the household is involuntarily unemployed or incapable of work. 
The weekly rate of assistance in each case is an amount which ensures 
that the weekly income of the household does not fall below the rates 
specified in the First Schedule to the National Assistance Act 1956. These 
rates are related to the number of persons in the household and range from 
37/6d. per week in the case of a family made up of one person, to £5.5.6d. 
in respect ef a household comprising ten or more members. There is to 
some degree, therefore, an overlap between Social Assistance and non-
contributory old age pensions. In certain circumstances a pensioner house-
29 B. Abel-Smith and P. Townsend: The Poor and the Poorest. Occasional Paper 
on Social Administration No. 17 G. Bell and Sons 1965. 
30 P. Townsend 'Measuring Poverty' British Journal of Sociology 1954. 
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hold may be ineligible for a non-contributory old age pension but not for 
Social Assistance namely, where a single elderly person's own income is 
large enough to extinguish the non-contributory old age pension but which 
leaves gross income below the poverty level,31 and when the income of 
the head of the household is too large for the non-contributory old age pen-
sion but by virtue of the size of the household qualifies for Social Assis-
tance. 
Figure III presents the levels of National Insurance old age pensions 
for married and single pensioners and the levels of Public Assistance for 
the same (assuming no other members of the household). It is to be noted 
that the single elderly receiving a non-contributory old age pension are 
also entitled to a house rent allowance of up to 5/- per week. In Figure 
IlIA it can be seen that the National Insurance benefit for a married couple 
has been above the level of Public Assistance, for the same couple, 
throughout most of the period under study. In 1968 the level of Public 
Assistance was made equal to the National Insurance benefit and in 1969 
the Assistance level rose 8.3% above the Insurance benefit, the differen-
tial being raised to 9.8% in 1970. This means that a married couple with 
no other income than the Insurance pension would have to rely on Public 
Assistance to reach the Government's own definition of the minimum level 
of living. The natural result has been that Public Assistance still plays 
an important role in the social security system and in fact has become re-
garded 'as a supplement for practical purposes'. 32 From Figure IIlB we 
can see that for a single person the Insurance pension had, until 1970, 
been above that of the Assistance level (including the rent allowance). 
The changes introduced in 1970 however, means that if the pensioner has 
no other income than the Insurance pension he will only just be at the of-
ficially defined minimum level of living. 
In view of these comments it might be rewarding to examine the statis-
tics of those receiving Public Assistance a little more closely. Although 
the numbers receiving non-contributory old age pensions have declined by 
25.6% this does to some extent understate the poverty typically found in 
the elderly section of the community. From experience in other countries 
there is generally a section of the elderly who do not apply for Public 
Assistance, 'due to a deep rooted and widespread aversion to anything 
31 This for our purpose is the most interesting case for we have an identity of 
household and personal income. There is however, no distinction made in of-
ficial statistics by which we may isolate these recipients. 
32 J. Vella Bonnici Director of Social Services: 18th February 1970. 
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which smacks of ameans test. It is probabl y true that some of the group ... 
entitled to but not receiving (National) Assistance were ignorant of their 
entitlement. More important, however, are those who are too proud. They 
are determined to ~manage while they can", and without going to ask for 
"charity,,,.33 
33 D. Wedderburn Financial Resources Available to Older People: Lessons for 
Social Policy in P.Hansen (ed.) Age with a Future Munksgaard, 1964. 
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Bearing this in mind we may continue to examine those receiving non-
contributory old age pensions. Table VI presents the num ber of pensioners 
classified according to age, sex: and weekly rate of pension. It is evident 
from the statistics that not only are the numbers of persons receiving non-
contributory old age pensions important for analysis but also the rates by 
which they are in receipt. Of a total of 12,254 old age pension claimants, 
83.9% were in the scale of 30/- to 27/6d. per week. This indicates that 
83.9% of the pensioners had own incomes which did not exceed £26.5.0d. 
per annum in the year 1968. Of this 83.9%, 22.9% were male and 61% fe-
Table VI 
ANALYSIS OF OLD AGE PENSIONS UNDER THE OLD AGE PENSIONS 
ACT 1948 BY WEEKLY RATE AS AT DECEMBER 1968 
NUMBER 30/- 27/- 25/- 23/- 21/- 19/- 18/-
OF TO TO TO TO TO TO TO 
PENSIONERS 27/6 25/6 23/6 21/6 19/6 18/6 17/6 
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F i 
60-64 486 1334 36 49 28 34 13 43 9 33 13 6 4 16! 
65-69 450 1661 19 74 14 64 17 46 13 23 6 9 7 14 
70-74 672 1914 35 65 29 54 19 41 14 32 9 11 9 18 
75-79 657 1454 24 49 27 41 19 35 19 25 - 13 4 16 
80 & over 535 1129 24 34 19 34 16 26 13 26 3 7 4 5 
2800 7492 138 271 117 227 84 191 68 139 31 46 28 69 
NUMBER 17/- 16/- 14/- 12/- UP TOTAL AS % OF 
OF TO TO TO TO TO AGE GROUP 
PENSIONERS 16/6 14/6 12/6 10/6 10/-
M F M F M F M F M F 
60-64 4 9 6 17 - 11 7 9 25 50 2242 15.6 
65-69 1 9 9 15 4 8 4 5 61 51 2584 23.6 
70-74 1 9 9 13 6 6 4 6 31 35 3042 40.2 i 
75-79 6 9 2 4 2 6 2 3 11 30 2458 47.6 
80 & over 3 8 4 7 - 3 4 7 6 11 1928 52.7 
15 44 30 56 12 34 21 30 134 177 12254 29.4 
M = Male 
F = Female 
Source: Department of Social Services 
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male. We can generally conclude that not only are there large numbers of el-
derly living with own incomes below the official poverty level, but the ma-
jority are substantially below this level, especially so for the female el-
derly. We also show in the Table the relationship between the number of 
persons in particular age groups and the numbers in receipt of non-contri-
butory old age pensions. 
Whilst only 15% of those aged 60 to 64 are in receipt of non-contributory 
old age pension, 53% of those aged over 80 are receiving them. Thus the 
higher the age group selected, the larger the proportion of that group with 
own incomes below the poverty line set by our definition. 34 The following 
conclusions arise from the analysis; the main group dependent upon non-
contributory old age pensions would seem to be the female elderly; when 
pensions are awarded the majority (84%) are in the highest possible range, 
indicating a severe degree of poverty before Assistance; the higher the 
age group the more dependent they become on non-contributory old age 
pensions. 
It is possible, using our definition of poverty, wi th its qualifications 
borne firmly in mind, to make a quantitative assessment for selected years 
of the number of persons amongst the elderly whose own income would 
have left them below the official minimum level of living. In Table VII we 
have presented as a percentage of the population over 60, the numbers re-
cei ving non-contributory old age pensions. 
In 1958, the year prior to the full operaci on of the National Insurance 
scheme, 45.1% of the over 60's were in receipt of the non-contributory old 
age pension. For reasons put forward earlier this figure has fallen progres-
sively to 26.9% in 1969. Had the pension for a married couple under the 
Insurance scheme stayed above the Assistance level this figure would 
have declined further. Bearing in mind our earlier comments as to those 
who decline to submit to the means test, we can state that at least 26.9% 
of persons aged 60 and over had incomes (before Assistance) which fell 
below the recognised poverty level. 3S 
34 We are only able to say that at least 53% of the over 80's have own incomes in 
this range for no allowance has been made for those in rece ipt of Social A s-
s istaoce who are not entitled to oon-contributory old age pensions. 
3S A further reason for this qualification is that we have not allowed for Social 
Assistance which is granted on the basis of a household means test. In 1969 
there were 468 households claiming Social Assistance where the head of the 
household was not receiving a non-contributory old age pension. As no indica-
tion is given as to the status of the household any allowance must be a crude 
addition to the totals given in Column A of Table VII. This would then raise the 
1969 percentage to 28.1 %. 
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Table VII 
AN ANALYSIS OF PERSONS OVER 60 YEARS RECEIVING 
NON-CONTRIBUTORY OLD AGE PENSIONS FOR SELECTED YEARS 
A B C 
PERCENTAGE OF AGED· 
YEAR NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS AS PERCENTAGE OF RECEIVING NON-CONTRIBUTORY 
OVER 60's OLD AGE PENSIONS 
1958 15,546 45.1' 48.8 
1959 15,244 43.4- 46.5 
1963 14,000 38.7 42.8 
1964 13,756 37.5 41.5 
1965 13,918 37.4 41.2-
1966 13,463 35.6 39.3 
1967 12,827 31.4 35.2 
1968 12,254 29.4 33.3 
1969 11,572 26.9 30.0 
• Men 63 and over, women 60 and over. See Table I. 
More closely related to the National Insurance Pension is column C 
which expresses as a percentage of the aged population the numbers of 
aged in receipt of non-contributory old age pensions. That is the percen-
tage of those eligible through age for an Insurance pension but receiving 
the non contributory pension. The wider coverage of and entitlement to, a 
National Insurance pension can explain in part the decline in the percen-
tage of 48.8% in 1958 to 30% in 1969. This rather large level, 30%, in 1969 
is due partly to the deficient insurance record of some of the aged and 
partly to the overlap of the Insurance and Assistance benefit as explained 
earlier. To isolate this latter type would require an investigation of the 
numbers receiving not only the Insurance old age pension but also a pen-
sion under the 1948 Act. Statistics are not however, available to make 
this possible, but their importance has been recognised by the Department 
of Social Services who will in future record such claimants separately. 
CONCLUSION 
As previously stated, old age pensions form by far the largest single 
item in social security payments. Because of their high cost special care 
is needed to resist pressures that would tend to make them over generous. 
'It is dangerous to be in any way lavish to old age until adequate provi-
sion has been assured for all other vital needs' .36 As has been pointed 
36 Sir William Beveridge Social Insurance and Allied Services p. 92, Cmnd. 6404, 
HMSO, London 1942. 
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out by ].Henry Richardson,37 this generosiry may not only exist in grant-
ing too large a pension but in fixing too young a pensionability age. Not 
only does this involve an additional cost in terms of financing pensions 
but also in terms of productivity of large numbers of people who are in-
fluenced (required) to cease work whilst still fit. 
The principle of earlier retirement may in fact be criticised as being 
based on a false premise. Early retirement is often supported on the as-
sumption that it represents an improvement in labour standards. It is seen 
as a reward to those who have given faithful service to the economy and 
that as the economy's productiviry increases a progressive reduction in 
the age of retirement is supported. This fails however to distinguish bet-
ween the aged in ill health, for whom retirement is a gain, and the aged 
both fit and desirous to work, for whom retirement may not be desired. In-
deed 'to attempt to force people to retire before their powers and desire 
for work fail ... should be avoided in any system of social insurance de-
signed to increase human happiness'. 38 
It has been stated recently that it is intended that the pensionability 
age under the National Insurance scheme should be reduced to 60 years, 
in line with the normal retiring age, and that this would be done over a 
period of three years. 39 One may therefore ask what should be the normal 
retiring age? All European countries have a pensionability age of more 
than 60, in most countries it is 65 and in Ireland pensionability age is 70. 
The only country nearby with a 60 year pensionability age is Libya. 
It could also be suggested that the reduction in the retirement age for 
men is the consequence of structural changes taking place in Malta. With 
the changing pattern of industry it is most likely that the elderly will find 
themselves being discharged before other members and with less chance 
of finding an alternative occupation due to retraining costs and alike. This 
would mean, for many, premature retirement and possibly th e reliance on 
Public Assistance. The reduction in the pensionability age from 63 to 60 
would therefore serve the function of both absorbing these otherwise 'des-
ti tute' elderly and of relieving the pre sen t loading on Public Assistance. 
We have shown that at least 26.9% of the population over 60, in 1969, 
were in a position where their own income fell below the recognised na-
tional minimum. The two groups most likely to fall below the Assistance 
37 J.Henry Richardson Economic and Financial Aspects 0/ Social Security: An 
International Survey, G.Allen and Unwin, 1960. 
38 Sir William Beveridge, op.cit., p.96. 
39 Prime Minister Dr. G. Borg Olivier, Budget Speech April 28th 1970. The pen-
sionability age was reduced from 63 years to 62 years from August 1970. 
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scale were single women and the very old. This can be explained in part 
by the fact that these groups received very little income from occupational 
pensions. It was also suggested that the numbers in receipt of assistance 
were somewhat understated - as many who would be eligible to receive 
it did not apply for two principal reasons. Firstly, they were not aware of 
their entitlement and secondly, they disliked the stigma attached to it. 
Although one might expect the stigma associated with assistance to be a 
relic of 'earlier' days, there is no evidence that younger persons are more 
willing to apply for Assistance. 
We have concentrated throughout this study on the social security treat-
ment of the aged in Malta. It would not be beyond the scope of this study 
to have dealt with the use of the tax system as an instrUment of aid for 
the aged. In other countries the aged have obtained certain tax conces-
sions which were designed to relieve from tax both earned and investment 
income of the elderly on low or modest incomes.4o It would be more appro-
priate however to deal with this topic when Malta's system of direct taxa-
tion has become more settled. Furthermore, the major drawback of using 
tax concessions is that individuals with the lowest incomes are unable to 
take full advantage of these concessions and hence there has been much 
interest recently in the positive approach to the provision of financial 
assistance for the needy.41 
We may conclude therefore, that there is still a need for a closer and 
more thorough study of the financial circumstances of the aged in Malta. 
We have outlined certain anomalies in the social security system and at-
tempted to compile raw data into grouped form in order to present a preli-
minary guide to the circumstances of the aged. For a fuller appreciation of 
these circumstances and thereby the attached problems of the aged not 
only should more information be given to the aged themselves but the au-
thorities should take up the responsibility of becoming more informed as 
to the requirements of the elderly. 
40 F or an appraisal of both the social security and tax treatment of the aged in 
the United Kingdom see G.P.Marshall, A.W.Rote, A.J.Walsh: An Appraisal 0/ 
the Special Tax Treatment 0/ the Aged in the United Kingdom. Bulletin for In-
ternational Fiscal Documentation Vol. XXIV June 1970 No.6 pp. 246-261. For a 
more rigorous analysis of each tax concession see A.J. Walsh, The Age Exem· 
ption and In/lation British Tax Review No. 5 1969 and A.J. Walsh and A.W. Rote: 
Age Relie/, In/lation and Savings British Tax Review No. 6, 1969. 
41 As witnessed by the growth of literature on income maintenance programmes 
and the findings of the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation, Ottawa, 1966 
which concluded that low income receivers require positive assistance. See 
Vol. Ill, pp. 220-221. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A 
NON-CONTRIBUTORY OLD AGE PENSIONS UNDER 
THE 1948 OLD AGE PENSION ACT 
YEAR MALE FEMALE 
1948 na na 
1949 na na 
1950 na na 
1951 na na 
1952 na na 
1953 na na 
1954 na na 
1955 ·5205 9341 
1956 5364 9502 
1957 5278 9891 
L----_ 
'---
(a) Adjusted to exclude under 60' s 
(b) Unadjusted 
(c) Three months 
Table B 
TOTAL a VALUE b 
£'s 
10,073 71,057 c 
12,870 379,842 
13,147 386,379 
12,830 387,298 
13,298 383,988 
13,130 390,028 
13,259 399,215 
14,546 521,018 
14,866 588,047 
15,169 634,983 
-
---_._-_ ......... _-_._------
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RECIPIENTS OF OLD AGE PENSION (1948 ACT) 
AGE/YEAR 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Under 60 - - - - - - - - 1 
60-64 35 36 37 33 36 29 36 30 24 
65-69 26 27 26 26 27 33 22 25 28 
70-74 22 20 20 19 19 20 34 22 22 
75-79 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 14 15 
80 & Ov. 7 7 7 12 8 8 8 9 10 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
% 
---_ .. -
_______________________ ._~ L--_ 
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Table C 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RECIPIENTS OF OLD AGE PENSION (1948 ACT) 
AGE/YEAR 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Under 60 
60-64 4491 4726 4682 4371 4309 3761 5250 
65-69 3327 3524 3333 3530 3505 4313 3212 
70-74 2844 2610 2554 2493 2512 2712 3503 
75-80 1351 1367 1306 1234 1351 1358 1367 
80 & over 857 920 955 1620 1053 1115 1214 
12,870 13,147 12,830 13,298 13,130 13,259 14,546 
AGE/YEAR 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
Under 60 30 41 27 44 31 37 
60-64 4602 3758 4401 4379 3406 3108 3829 
65-69 3649 4222 3745 3913 3943 3749 3698 
70-74 3224 3405 3748 3503 3236 3427 3252 
75-80 2032 2257 2249 2370 2438 2298 2138 
80 & over 1339 1527 1403 1079 1609 1600 1345 
14,866 15,103 15,587 15,271 14,676 14,213 14,299 
AGE/YEAR 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Under 60 44 69 79 85 83 77 57 
60-64 2721 2717 2836 3200 2477 2242 1987 
65-69 3448 3478 3488 3363 2706 2584 2474 
70-74 3582 3288 3381 3081 3131 3042 2704 
75-79 2393 2462 2361 2179 2208 2458 2430 
80 & over 1856 1811 1852 1638 2305 1928 1977 
14,044 13,825 13,997 13,548 18,910 12,331 11 ,629 
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